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Abstract
It has been argued that terrorism should not have a large e®ect on economic activity,
because terrorist attacks destroy only a small fraction of the stock of capital of a
country (see, e.g., Becker and Murphy, 2001). In contrast, empirical estimates of the
consequences of terrorism typically suggest large e®ects on economic outcomes (see,
e.g., Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003). The main theme of this article is that mobility
of productive capital in an open economy may account for much of the di®erence
between the direct and the equilibrium impact of terrorism. We use a simple economic
model to show that terrorism may have a large impact on the allocation of productive
capital across countries, even if it represents a small fraction of the overall economic
risk. The model emphasizes that, in addition to increasing uncertainty, terrorism
reduces the expected return to investment. As a result, changes in the intensity of
terrorism may cause large movements of capital across countries if the world economy
is su±ciently open, so international investors are able to diversify other types of
country risks. Using a unique dataset on terrorism and other country risks, we ¯nd
that, in accordance with the predictions of the model, higher levels of terrorist risks
are associated with lower levels of net foreign direct investment positions, even after
controlling for other types of country risks. A standard deviation increase in the
terrorist risk induces a fall in the net foreign direct investment position of about 5
percent of GDP. The magnitude of the estimated e®ect is large, which suggests that
the \open-economy channel" impact of terrorism may be substantial.
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This paper analyzes the e®ects of terrorism in an integrated world economy. From an
economic standpoint, terrorism has been described to have four main e®ects (see, e.g., US
Congress, Joint Economic Committee, 2002). First, the capital stock (human and physical)
of a country is reduced as a result of terrorist attacks. Second, the terrorist threat induces
higher levels of uncertainty. Third, terrorism promotes increases in counter-terrorism ex-
penditures, drawing resources from productive sectors for use in security. Fourth, terrorism
is known to a®ect negatively speci¯c industries such as tourism.1 However, this classi¯ca-
tion does not include the potential e®ects of increased terrorist threats in an open economy.
In this article, we use a stylized macroeconomic model of the world economy and inter-
national data on terrorism and the stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) assets and
liabilities to study the economic e®ects of terrorism in an integrated world economy.
The motivation to study the impact of terrorism in an open world economy is the fol-
lowing. It has been documented that the direct impact of terrorist attacks on productive
capital is relatively modest. This seems to be true even for events of catastrophic terror-
ism. For example, Becker and Murphy (2001) estimated that the September 11th terrorist
attacks resulted in a loss of 0.06 percent of the total productive assets of the US economy.
In consequence, after taking into account the four channels mentioned in the previous para-
graph, some authors have argued that terrorism is unlikely to exert a signi¯cant in°uence
on economic activity in the long-run. The calculations in Becker and Murphy (2001) bound
the long-run e®ect of the September 11th attacks to 0.3 percent of GDP (see also IMF,
2001a and OECD, 2001).2
In contrast, reduced-form estimates of the economic e®ects of terrorism typically suggest
much larger e®ects. For example, in our previous study of the impact of terrorism in the
Basque Country, we ¯nd a 10 percent drop in per capita GDP which emerges during
a period of two decades and that is attributable to the terrorist con°ict (Abadie and
1See Enders, Sandler, and Parise (1992) on the e®ect of terrorism on tourism.
2In a more recent paper, Becker and Rubinstein (2004) have argued that terrorism risk may have a
large economic impact if the fear of terrorism a®ects individual utility in each state of nature.
1Gardeazabal, 2003). Chen and Siems (2004), Enders and Sandler (1996), Frey, Luechinger,
and Stutzer (2004a), and Pshisva and Suarez (2004) similarly ¯nd large e®ects of terrorism
on economic variables.3 However, as noted by Becker and Rubinstein (2004), the question of
why terrorism may have a large e®ect on the economy, even if it represents a small fraction
of the total economic risk, has attracted much less attention in the academic literature.
The main theme of this paper is that mobility of productive factors in an open economy
may account for much of the di®erence between the direct e®ect and the equilibrium e®ect
of terrorism on the economy. If terrorism is a local phenomenon, capital will tend to °ow
to destinations without a terrorist threat, reducing net foreign investment in the economies
a®ected by terrorism. Even if terrorism is a global threat, international investment will
respond to di®erences in the expected intensity of terrorism across countries. In fact,
because the optimal allocation of capital across countries depends not only on the level of
terrorism but also on other country factors that a®ect the distributions of the returns to
capital, variations in the overall level of terrorism in the world may induce a re-allocation
of capital across countries even if the relative intensity of terrorist risk across countries
remains unchanged.
The amounts of foreign direct investment in the U.S. before and after the September
11th attacks provide some suggestive evidence of the open-economy channel of terrorism.
In the year 2000, the year before the terrorist attacks, foreign direct investment in°ows
represented about 15.8 percent of the Gross Fixed Capital Formation in the U.S. This
¯gure decreased to only 1.5 percent in 2003, two years after the attacks. Conversely,
foreign direct investment out°ows from the U.S. increased from about 7.2 percent of the
Gross Fixed Capital Formation for the U.S. in 2000 to 7.5 percent in 2003 (see UNCTAD,
2004). Of course, not all this drop in FDI in the U.S. can be attributed to the e®ect of
the September 11th attacks. As of September 2001 foreign direct investment in°ows had
fallen from its 2000 peak not only in the U.S. but also in other developed economies (see
UNCTAD, 2002). These ¯gures, however, motivate the question of to which extent an
3Frey, Luechinger, and Stutzer (2004b) surveys the existing research on the economic impact of terror-
ism.
2increase in the perceived level of terrorism was responsible for the drop in FDI in the U.S.
that followed the events of September 11th.
Surveys of international corporate investors provide direct evidence of the importance
of terrorism on foreign investment. Corporate investors rate terrorism as one of the most
important factors in°uencing their foreign direct investment decisions (see Global Business
Policy Council, 2004).
To illustrate the importance of the \open-economy channel" of terrorism we use a
stochastic version of the AK endogenous growth model (see, e.g., Obtsfeld, 1994, and
Turnovsky, 1997). We extend this model by introducing terrorism as a stochastic Poisson
process, with events that destroy some fraction of the capital stock of a country.
The model emphasizes that beyond increasing uncertainty, terrorism reduces expected
return to investment. As a result, changes in the intensity of terrorism have an ambiguous
e®ect on the overall investment position of the world (investments over wealth), but they
may cause large movements of capital across countries if the world economy is su±ciently
open, so international investors are diversi¯ed against other types of country risks.
One of the predictions of our model is that, like any other risk, terrorism should a®ect
the stock of international investment in any particular country. Therefore, it is possible to
obtain empirical evidence on the \open-economy channel" of terrorism by looking at the
relationship between net foreign investment and terrorism in the cross-section of countries,
as long as we account for other factors that a®ect international investment positions, partic-
ularly other country risks which may be correlated with terrorism levels. For this purpose,
we use a unique international dataset on terrorism risk and other types of country risks.
We ¯nd that terrorism has a negative and sizeable impact on foreign investment positions.
Enders and Sandler (1996) have also studied the e®ect of terrorism on capital °ows
across countries. Using vector autoregression methods, these authors estimated a negative
13.5 percent e®ect of terrorism on foreign direct investment for Spain (for the period 1976-
91) and a negative 11.9 percent e®ect for Greece (for the period 1975-91). Our empirical
results for a cross-section of countries corroborate and provide external validity to the
3results of Enders and Sandler.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we built a simple model
that illustrates why terrorism may have a large e®ect on net foreign investment in an open
world economy even if terrorism induces only a small fraction of the total economic risk.
Section 3 describes the data set. Section 4 provides empirical evidence on the e®ect of
terrorism on foreign direct investment. Section 5 concludes.
2. A Simple Model of Catastrophic Terrorism
2.1. The Model
Consider a two-country economy with terrorism and perfect capital mobility across coun-
tries. We will refer to one of the countries as the \domestic economy" and to the other
as the \foreign economy". The world population consists of a continuum of identical and
in¯nitely-lived agents with mass equal to one, who are equally distributed among the two
countries. At each point in time, t, agents decide how much to consume, C(t), and which
fraction, v(t), of the capital to devote to production in the domestic economy (with a
fraction 1 ¡ v(t) devoted to production in the foreign economy). If the fraction of capital
devoted to a country changes, this change generates a °ow of investment from one country
to the other.
As in Obstfeld (1994) and Turnovsky (1997), we assume that production in the domestic
economy is given by a stochastic AK technology:
dY (t) = ®v(t)K(t)dt + ¾Wv(t)K(t)dW(t);
where dY (t) is output, K(t) is the world stock of capital (physical and human), and W(t)
is a Wiener process, whose innovations capture domestic productivity shocks.
The assumptions of constant returns to scale and perfect capital mobility across coun-
tries are not totally innocuous. These assumptions increase the sensitivity of the allocation
of capital across countries to di®erences in the distributions of the return to capital be-
tween countries. The assumptions of constant returns to scale and perfect capital mobility
4across countries are likely to be violated in the short run. However, these assumptions are
consistent with the long run trends in the allocation of capital across countries.4
Terrorist attacks are captured in this model as innovations from a Poisson process, P(t)
with rate ¸, which destroy a fraction ± of the stock of capital allocated by every investor to
the domestic economy, with 0 · ± · 1. After the direct impact of terrorism is taken into
account, the return to capital in the domestic economy is governed by a jump-di®usion:
dR(t) =
dY (t) ¡ ±v(t)K(t)dP(t)
v(t)K(t)
= ®dt + ¾W dW(t) ¡ ± dP(t):
By the properties of Wiener and Poisson processes, the expectation and variance of the
return to capital in the domestic economy are:






Therefore, an increase in the intensity of domestic terrorism, ¸, reduces the expected return
to capital in the domestic economy and increases its variance.
Production and terrorism follow analogous processes in the foreign economy, for which
we will use the notation: ®¤, ¾¤
W, ±¤, ¸¤, dW ¤(t), and dP ¤(t).
Agents derive instantaneous utility from consumption, C(t), through a constant relative
risk aversion utility function: u(c) = (c1¡° ¡ 1)=(1 ¡ °), with ° > 0 and c > 0 (taking the
limiting form u(c) = ln(c), for ° = 1). The parameter ° is the Arrow-Pratt measure of
relative risk aversion, ° = ¡cu00(c)=u0(c).
Agents choose C(t) and v(t) to maximize lifetime discounted utility, subject to the law
of motion for capital. Because all agents have the same preferences and investment pos-
sibilities, regardless of how ownership of productive capital is distributed, the equilibrium
4McGrattan (1998) and Li (2002) present evidence that long-run trends in investment and growth are
consistent with the predictions of the AK model. More importantly for the purpose of this article, Kraay
and Ventura (2000, 2002) show that the observed long-run patterns in the allocation of capital across
countries are consistent with weak diminishing returns to capital.










s.t. dK(t) = (®v(t)K(t) + ®¤(1 ¡ v(t))K(t) ¡ C(t))dt
+¾Wv(t)K(t)dW(t) + ¾¤
W(1 ¡ v(t))K(t)dW ¤(t)
¡±v(t)K(t)dP(t) ¡ ±¤(1 ¡ v(t))K(t)dP ¤(t);
0 · C(t) · K(t);K(t) ¸ 0;K(0) = K0;0 · v(t) · 1:
(1)
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for this problem is:
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for some function, V (k). (See appendix for a detailed derivation of the solution.) Solving
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¤(1 ¡ b v))
¡° = 0: (3)
Notice that equation (3) implies that the optimal share of capital invested in the domestic
economy is time-invariant, for any given value of the parameters of the model.
Let µ be the fraction of the world's productive capital owned by residents of the domestic
economy. Domestic consumption and wealth are equal to µC(t) and µK(t) respectively.
Similarly, foreign consumption and wealth are equal to (1 ¡ µ)C(t) and (1 ¡ µ)K(t). In
this economy, domestic and foreign residents hold the same portfolio of assets, a share in
6the world portfolio. Hence, the distribution of consumption and wealth among countries is
time-invariant. However, production depends on the allocation of capital across countries.
Therefore, the distribution of the stock of capital between countries depends on the intensity
of terrorism in both countries and the other parameters of the model.
2.2. The Effects of Terrorism
In this economy, terrorism a®ects capital accumulation through three di®erent channels.
First, terrorist events directly destroy part of the capital stock of a country, ±. As explained
above, in practice, the quantitative importance of this e®ect seems to be small.
Second, terrorism changes the process that determines the return to capital, a®ecting the
overall investment position of the individuals in the world economy. However, the direction
of this second e®ect is theoretically ambiguous. In the absence of a terrorist attack, every
unit of capital is either consumed or saved as productive capital. Let ¼C = C(t)=K(t) be








1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±b v)
1¡°¤
: (4)
As shown in equation (4), terrorism increases the consumption-wealth ratio if ° < 1 and
decreases the consumption-wealth ratio if ° > 1. The reason is that terrorism reduces the
average return to investment and increases its variance. As a result, terrorism induces a
negative income e®ect and a positive substitution e®ect on consumption. The negative
income e®ect dominates when ° > 1. However, the positive substitution e®ect dominates
for individuals with risk aversion smaller than that given by logarithmic utility. (The
substitution and income e®ects are derived in the appendix.)
Finally, and most importantly for the purpose of this article, terrorism a®ects the
allocation of productive capital across countries. The international investment position
of the domestic economy is determined by the fraction of the world's capital owned by
residents of the domestic economy, µ, and the fraction of the world's capital allocated to
production in the domestic economy, b v. In the notation of the model, the international
7investment position of the domestic economy is equal to foreign holdings of domestic capital
(1 ¡ µ)b vK(t) minus domestic holdings of foreign capital µ(1 ¡ b v)K(t). Therefore, the
international investment position of the domestic economy (normalized by the amount of
productive capital allocated to the domestic economy, b vK(t)) is equal to 1¡µ=b v. If b v > µ,
net foreign investment is positive in the domestic economy and negative in the foreign
economy. Conversely, if b v < µ, net foreign investment is positive in the foreign economy
and negative in the domestic economy.
To investigate the e®ect of terrorism on net foreign investment, we di®erentiate equation




±(1 ¡ ±b v)¡°
°(¾2
W + ¾¤2
W) + ¸±2°(1 ¡ ±b v)¡°¡1 + ¸¤±¤2°(1 ¡ ±¤(1 ¡ b v))¡°¡1 < 0:
In the model, terrorism has an unambiguously negative e®ect on b v. Notably, the magnitude
of this e®ect is unbounded. In this simple two-country model, the e®ect of terrorism on
capital allocation across countries will be small if the direct impact of terrorist attacks,
represented by ±, is small, as long as the degree of risk aversion of international investors,
°, is relatively large. However, if international investors are close to risk neutrality (if °
is close to zero), terrorist risk will have a large e®ect on the allocation of capital across
countries. The reason is that, in contrast to smooth risk, an increase in the intensity of
catastrophic terrorism not only increases the variance of the return to investment, it also
decreases its average. Investors with low levels of risk aversion have no reason to diversify
country risk, and react abruptly to relative changes in the intensity of terrorism.
This may be an important consideration in practice. If international investors are
su±ciently diversi¯ed, they will have no reason to invest in countries with relatively high
levels of terrorist risk (if it is di±cult to diversify terrorist risk locally). To illustrate this
point, suppose that the world economy consists of N economies (the domestic economy
plus N ¡ 1 foreign countries). To simplify the exposition, assume that only the domestic
economy is exposed to terrorism and that in the absence of a terrorist shock production in
country i (i = 1;:::;N) is given by the stochastic process
®vi(t)K(t) + ¾vi(t)K(t)dWi(t);
8where W1;:::;WN are independent Wiener processes. As before, terrorism in the domestic
economy is described by a Poisson process with coe±cients (¸;±). In this scenario, the
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¡° = 0:
If there is no terrorism (¸ = 0), then the domestic economy receives a fraction 1=N of
world's capital. If there is terrorism in the domestic economy but not in the rest of the
world (¸ > 0), then b v will be smaller than 1=N. Moreover, notice that b v=(1=N) · maxf1¡
(¸±=°¾2)(N ¡ 1);0g, so for any given value of °, the ratio b v=(1=N) will be small when the
number of countries, N, is large. The reason is that when investment can be placed in
many countries international investors are able to diversify risk without allocating capital
to countries with a higher relative risk of terrorism and therefore with a lower expected
return.
Figure 1 shows how diversi¯cation opportunities accentuate the impact of terrorism on
net foreign investments. The left hand side panel of Figure 1 shows the value of b v=(1=N)
as a function of the number of countries N, for ° = 1. The three series on the graph
represent three di®erent values (100, 200, and 400) for ¾=(¸1=2±), which is the ratio of the
standard deviation of non-terrorist risk over the standard deviation of terrorist risk. The
values of ¸ and ± are set to 0.10 and 0.0005, respectively. The right hand side panel of
Figure 1 shows the same graph for ° = 10, a substantially higher degree of risk aversion.
The value of b v=(1=N) decreases rapidly with N in all cases. In the case of ° = 1 and
¾=(¸1=2±) = 100, there is no investment in the domestic economy if the world consists of
more than a few countries. Even in the case of ° = 10 and ¾=(¸1=2±) = 400, b v=(1=N) is
about 10% lower than one (the value that it would take in the absence of terrorism) with
80 countries. Figure 1 shows that, even if terrorist risk is only a small fraction of total
economic risk, it may still have a large economic impact in an open economy.
92.3. Model interpretation and empirical design
In the empirical section of this article, we use a measure of terrorism risk at the country
level produced by an international risk rating agency to study the e®ect of terrorism on
net foreign direct investment positions.
We choose to investigate the e®ect of terrorism on international investment positions
rather than on capital °ows for various reasons. First, as explained above, the equilibrium
portrayed by our model can be interpreted as a description of the long-run relationship be-
tween terrorism risk and international investment positions at the country level. Because
the model lacks transitional dynamics, it cannot e®ectively describe short-run capital move-
ments in response to variations in the intensity of terrorism. Moreover, because diminishing
returns to capital and adjustment costs are expected to be substantial in the short run, a
study of the e®ects of changes in the intensity of terrorism on short-run capital movements
will underestimate the long-run impact of terrorism.
In addition, while measures of terrorism risk in the cross-section of countries exist, we
currently lack adequate longitudinal risk data to conduct a direct study of capital °ows.
In principle, short term variations in terrorist risk levels could be used in a ¯xed-e®ects
model to estimate the e®ect of terrorism on foreign direct investment while controlling
for unobserved determinants of foreign direct investment that are ¯xed in the short run.
In practice, however, the use of longitudinal data on terrorist risk would be extremely
problematic. On the one hand terrorist risk does not seem to display much short-term
variation.5 On the other hand, it may be di±cult to establish the exact timing of the
impact of a change in terrorist risk on foreign direct investment. International investors
may perceive short term changes in terrorist risk before or after the risk rating data indicate,
and the response of foreign direct investment to short term changes in the level of terrorist
risk may be attenuated in the short run by the irreversible nature of direct investment.
Finally, notice that short-term longitudinal data on terrorist events or casualties may
5For example, the terrorist risk index produced every year since 1995 by the Economist Intelligence
Unit for a set of 60 countries did not report any change in the level of terrorist threat for any country until
the year 2001.
10not be adequate to estimate the impact of terrorism risk in a ¯xed e®ects model. The reason
is that in most countries terrorist incidents are low-probability events. Therefore, short-
term variation in the level of terrorist activity may be large even if the underlying level of
terrorist risk experiences little variation. In other words, terrorist events or casualties are
noisy measures of the latent level of terrorist risk. As a result, the regression coe±cients
on variables measuring terrorist events or casualties will be biased towards zero. Time
di®erencing the data in a ¯xed e®ects model is known to exacerbate errors-in-variables
biases (Griliches and Hausman, 1986). In addition, the use of direct indicators of terrorist
events or casualties present other problems, which are described in Section 3.
Of course, the main disadvantage of using cross-sectional data is the potential for omit-
ted variable bias. To address this problem we perform a careful sensitivity analysis and
demonstrate that the results of the empirical section are robust to many di®erent speci¯-
cations.
As explained in the following section, country level data on foreign direct investment
are readily available for 196 countries and the sample period considered in the empirical
section. The same is not true yet for debt and portfolio investment. Thus, we restrict
our attention to direct investment, and do not consider debt and portfolio investment. A
more substantive reason for dealing only with foreign direct investment is that debt and
portfolio investment are heavily a®ected by ¯nancial crises, the degree of development of
the countries' ¯nancial institutions, and complicated capital control schemes.
3. The Data
The model we developed in the previous section predicts that, even if terrorist attacks
destroy only a small fraction of the productive capital of a country, increases in terrorist
risk may greatly a®ect the allocation of international investment across countries. In the
next section, we use a unique dataset on terrorist and other country risks to quantify the
impact of terrorism on net foreign direct investment (net FDI) positions.
The evidence presented below uses data on the net stock of FDI from a cross-section
11of countries. Data on FDI stocks come from the United Nations Conference on Trade And
Development (UNCTAD, 2004). The UNCTAD database provides information on FDI
stocks in the year 2003 for 196 countries and territories. Net FDI positions are measured
as direct investment liabilities minus direct investment assets normalized by GDP.6 We will
sometimes refer to the net FDI position as a fraction of GDP simply as net FDI positions.
Our measure of country terrorism risk is the World Markets Research Centre's Global
Terrorism Index (GTI). The Global Terrorism Index seems to be the ¯rst comprehensive
attempt to measure globally the risk from terrorist attacks at the country level. The
Global Terrorism Index covers 186 countries and territories for the period 2003/4. The
Global Terrorism Index combines expert ratings of the motivation, presence, scale, e±cacy,
and prevention of terrorism at the country level.7
Previous empirical studies on terrorism have used two types of indicators of terrorist
activity: the number of terrorist incidents and the number of casualties. These measures
may su®er from several drawbacks. As noted by Frey, Luechinger and Stutzer (2004b), the
number of attacks and casualties collected from o±cial statistics or from the media may
underestimate the actual number of casualties caused by terrorism. In addition, data on
terrorist incidents group together attacks of di®erent magnitude and signi¯cance. Perhaps
more importantly, in the risk-based analysis of this paper, terrorism is not simply a history
of violence, but a latent variable representing the uncertainty created by the possibility of
future terrorist attacks. Statistics on the number of terrorist events or casualties may not
fully re°ect the level of terrorism perceived by international investors.
Terrorist risk ratings, like the GTI, do not su®er from these drawbacks and incorpo-
rate information that relate to risk but are not re°ected in casualties, like motivation of
terrorists or prevention by the authorities. Moreover, because risk ratings are commonly
used by international investors to evaluate speci¯c country risks, they have the advantage
6FDI assets (liabilities), are de¯ned as the value of capital and reserves, including retained pro¯ts,
invested in a foreing (the domestic) economy attributable to the parent enterprise, plus the net indebtedness
of a±liates to the parent enterprise resident in the domestic (a foreign) economy. Data on FDI stocks is
at book value or historical cost, re°ecting prices at the time when the investment was made.
7See World Markets Research Centre (2003) for further information on the Global Terrorism Index.
12of directly re°ecting one of the most important channels through which information about
terrorism risk is revealed to international investors. Consequently, terrorism risk ratings
are particularly relevant as a measure of terrorism risk to evaluate the e®ect of terrorism
on international investment. A disadvantage of terrorism risk ratings is that they provide
only a summary measure of an intrinsically complex phenomenon.
Like any other risk, terrorism should depress the stock of international investment in
any particular country. Therefore, empirical evidence on the \open-economy channel" of
terrorism can be obtained using a cross-section of countries. In our regressions, we measure
the amount of variance of net FDI stock (normalized by the country GDP) explained by
terrorist risk. Because international investors take into account other types of risk factors
such as the overall political, legal, and security environments of the target country, this
exercise must acknowledge sources of risk other than terrorism. As we will show below,
these other risk factors correlate with terrorist risk. Therefore, it is important to control in
our regressions for other risk factors which may also a®ect foreign investment. Risk rating
data allow us to do exactly this. We include in our regressions a country risk index also
produced by the World Markets Research Centre (WMRC). The WMRC Country Risk
Index combines six risk factors (political, economic, legal, tax, operational, and security)
into an overall country risk index.
As explained in the previous section, the net foreign investment position of a country
is a®ected by the fraction of world's productive capital owned by the residents of that
country. Because rich countries have higher per capita levels of capital, we include in our
regressions the countries' levels of GDP per capita as an explanatory variable (these data
come from the World Bank, 2004).
Of course, the stock of foreign investment of a country depends crucially on the degree of
the country's openness to capital mobility. To measure the degree of openness of a country
to foreign capital we use the index of capital °ows and foreign investment restrictions
published as a factor of the Index of Economic Freedom by The Heritage Foundation and
The Wall Street Journal (Miles et al, 2004).8
8Available at: http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/.
13Finally, regional factors not accounted for by the country risk ratings or the other
explanatory variables may also in°uence the investment position of a country. To control
for these e®ects, we include regional dummies in many of the regressions reported below.
4. Empirical Analysis
4.1. Main Results
This section assesses the e®ect of terrorism on foreign direct investment positions in an open
world economy. Some of the 186 countries included in the WMRC Global Terrorism Index
impose severe restrictions on foreign direct investment, hence they are excluded because
they do not comply with the open market environment considered in this article. For
this reason we use the classi¯cation published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF,
2001b) to restrict our sample to 110 countries with no restrictions on FDI repatriations and
available data on FDI assets and liabilities as well as GDP. Additionally, when a measure
of openness to FDI is included in the regression the sample is further restricted to 98
countries. Table B1 in appendix B lists the countries in the full 186-country sample and
subsamples.
Table 1 describes the terrorist and country risk data for the 186-country full sample
and the 110-country regression sample. Among country risk factors, security exhibits the
highest correlation with terrorist risk (GTI). Part of the correlation between the terrorism
index and the country risk security factor is created mechanically, because the security
factor of the Country Risk Index incorporates a measure of terrorism in addition to other
measures of civil unrest, crime, and external security threats. We construct an alternative
country risk index, termed corrected Country Risk Index (corrected CRI), based on the
same factors as the original Country Risk Index but excluding security risk (see Appendix
B). The cross-country regressions reported below use both the original and the corrected
Country Risk Index. Regressions with the original Country Risk Index should underesti-
mate the negative impact of terrorism on foreign direct investment, because terrorism risk
is one of the components of that index. Regressions with the corrected Country Risk Index
14should overestimate the negative impact of terrorism on foreign direct investment, because
the regression does not take into account the e®ect of other security risks which are likely
to have a positive correlation with terrorist risk. Using both the original and the corrected
Country Risk Index we obtain coe±cients that can be interpreted respectively as a lower
bound and an upper bound to the negative e®ect of terrorism on net FDI positions. As we
show below, the regression results depend little on which one of the two the country risk
indices, corrected or uncorrected, is used as a regressor.
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the economic variables. Net FDI positions may
represent a large quantity relative to GDP and exhibit high disparities among countries;
in our regression sample, net FDI positions over GDP average 28 percentage points with
a standard deviation of 39 percentage points. Net FDI positions and national income are
both negatively correlated with our measure of terrorist risk, whereas the level of FDI
restrictions has a positive correlation with terrorism. Table 2 also reports descriptive
statistics for demographic factors, governance measures and other explanatory variables
used in the regressions reported later in the paper.
Table 3 reports cross-country regressions for the 110-country sample. Column (1) re-
ports the result of regressing net FDI positions (over GDP) on a constant term and the
Global Terrorism Index. The coe±cient on the terrorism risk is negative and statistically
di®erent from zero at conventional test levels. The R-squared coe±cient indicates that
terrorism explains about 2 percent of the cross-country variance in net FDI positions.
The coe±cient on the Global Terrorism Index in column (2) remains negative and
signi¯cant after including log GDP per capita in the regression speci¯cation. As expected,
log GDP per capita exhibits also a negative regression coe±cient. The results remain
similar when we include regional dummies in the regression speci¯cation in column (3).
In column (4) we include other potential determinants of foreign investment: a measure
of the severity of the barriers to foreign capital and the WMRC Country Risk Index.
As expected, the new variables exhibit negative coe±cients. The inclusion of the overall
country risk index and the other new variables leaves the coe±cient on the Global Terrorism
15Index with a value of -0.21 percent of GDP and signi¯cant at the 10% level.
As explained above, because one component of the security factor of the Country Risk
Index is a measure of terrorism, the coe±cient on the Global Terrorism Index in column
(4) incorporates a positive bias relative to a hypothetical regression using a measure of
country risks which does not account for terrorism. Therefore, the coe±cient on the Global
Terrorism Index in column (4) can be interpreted as an upper bound on the coe±cient of
interest (that is, it underestimates the negative impact of terrorism on net FDI). To obtain
a lower bound, in column (5) we estimate the same speci¯cation as in column (4) but using
a corrected version of the Country Risk Index that does not include the security risk factor.
Because security threats other than terrorism, which are unaccounted for in column (5), are
likely to be positively correlated with terrorism and a®ect FDI negatively, the coe±cient
on the Global Terrorism Index incorporates a negative bias (it overestimates the negative
impact of terrorism on net FDI). The value of the coe±cient on terrorism risk in column
(5) is -0.25 percent of GDP, slightly lower than the value of the same coe±cient in column
(4).
To give an idea of the magnitude of the estimated e®ect of terrorist risk, let us consider
the e®ect of a one standard deviation change in terrorist risk on the net FDI position. A
standard deviation change in terrorist risk is a change of 19.82 (18.77 in the 110-country
regression sample) in the Global Terrorism Index. This change is about the di®erence in
terrorist risk between Italy and the United States (the latter being more risky). Using the
parameter estimated of Table 3 column (5), this increase in terrorist risk induces a fall in
the net FDI position of about 5 percent of GDP. This ¯gure is large suggesting that the
open-economy e®ect of terrorism may be substantial.
4.2. Robustness Analysis
In this section we perform several robustness checks on the speci¯cation of the regression
equation. We extend the regression equation to include demographic factors, human capi-
tal, governance indicators, macroeconomic risk, ¯nancial factors, and other variables that
16could potentially a®ect the net FDI positions.
4.2.1. Demographic Factors
As a ¯rst robustness check we include in our regression demographic factors. The popu-
lation age-structure may a®ect foreign direct investment. Life-cycle theory suggests that
countries with young populations should be net debtors to the rest of the world. In addition,
multinational corporations engaging in FDI often target countries where the population is
young, so labor is an abundant production factor. Furthermore, the empirical evidence in
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002) indicates that demographic factors exert a signi¯cant e®ect
on the net foreign assets position of countries, especially for the developing world.
In Table 4 we expand the set of explanatory variables by including demographic factors
such as the fraction of population under age 14, the fraction of the population over age 65,
and the age dependency ratio.9 The results of columns (1) to (3) indicate that our prior
results are robust against the inclusion of measures of the percentages of the population
under age 14 and over age 65. These age-range population variables exhibit statistically
signi¯cant coe±cients only when included together, as in columns (3) and (5). In column
(4), we add the age dependency ratio to the regression as an additional explanatory variable.
The coe±cient on the age dependency ratio is not statistically signi¯cant, and the inclusion
of this variable in the regression exerts little e®ect on the coe±cients of the other variables.
Countries' levels of human capital plausibly in°uence international investment positions.
In order to determine the importance of human capital in the determination of net FDI
positions we have included in column (6) of Table 4 a proxy for human capital, the net
enrollment rate in primary school. These data, from United Nations Educational Scienti¯c
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), were available for 80 countries of the regression
sample. We ¯nd that the coe±cient on the enrollment rate is not statistically signi¯cant.
The inclusion of this variable in the regression increases the standard errors of the other
estimated coe±cients and renders them insigni¯cant (probably because of a combination
9The age dependency ratio is the fraction of the population under 14 and over 65 divided by the fraction
between the ages of 14 and 65.
17of the smaller sample size on the regression in column (6) and the high correlation between
enrollment rate and other included variables).10
4.2.2. Other Types of Country Risks
While this paper focuses on terrorist risk, other types of country risk may be relatively
important in international investment decisions. Here we test the robustness of our ¯ndings
on terrorist risk by including the unique factors which comprise the WMRC Country Risk
Index individually in our speci¯cation.
The WMRC Country Risk Index used in our regressions accounts for political, economic,
legal, tax, operational, and security factors by aggregating them into a single measure of
country risk. The political factor measures political instability and indicates how mature
and well-established the political system is. The economic factor assesses the economic
stance of the country in terms of the freedom of market forces and the macroeconomic
fundamentals of the economy. The legal factor indicates how well-established the legal
system is and whether necessary business laws are in place. The tax factor measures the
coherence and fairness of the tax system as well as the overall level of taxes. The operational
factor is an assessment of the degree of openness to FDI, the quality of infrastructure, how
well the labor market functions, and bureaucracy and corruption. Finally, the security
factor measures threats originating from civil unrest, crime, terrorism, as well as external
threats.
Table 5 reports regressions where we have included political, economic, legal, tax, op-
erational, and security factors. None of the ¯rst ¯ve factors signi¯cantly in°uence foreign
direct investment positions either taken together (column (1)) or one at a time (columns
(2)-(6)). The previous results for terrorist risk and the other explanatory variables remain
robust across these regressions. In column (7), we introduce in the regression the secu-
rity factor of the WMRC Country Risk Index (which includes terrorist risk) in lieu of the
WMRC Global Terrorism Index. The coe±cient on the security factor is negative and sta-
10Using the average number of years of schooling of adults and the net enrollment rate in secondary
school as proxies for the level of human capital yields very similar results, but the sample is restricted to
a smaller number of countries.
18tistically signi¯cant. This suggests that terrorism and, more generally, security are among
the most apparent country-speci¯c determinants of net FDI.
4.2.3. Governance Indicators
Here we test the robustness of our ¯ndings against potential omitted governance variables
that may be important determinants of net FDI positions. To control for corruption and
other forms of mis-governance, we employ a data set compiled by Kaufmann, Kraay and
Mastruzzi (2004) that provides indicators on the e±cacy of six dimensions of governance.
These dimensions include:
1. Voice and accountability: measures an aggregate of civil liberties, political rights,
and other aspects of the political system representing the accountability of the gov-
ernment;
2. Political stability and absence of violence: measures the likelihood that the govern-
ment will not be destabilized or overthrown by violent means, including terrorism;
3. Government e®ectiveness: measures the ability of governments to implement and
enforce their policies;
4. Regulatory quality: measures the absence of market-unfriendly policies;
5. Rule of law: measures the protection of property rights and the extent to which
residents have con¯dence in the rules of society; and
6. Control of corruption: measures the degree to which public power is not perceived
by the population as used for private gain.11
The political stability indicator, which incorporates (lack of) terrorism, exhibits a high
correlation with the WMRC Global Terrorism Index in Table 2. We report the regression
results including these six indicators of governance in columns (1)-(6) of Table 3. None of
the coe±cients of these indicators are statistically signi¯cant. More importantly, with the
exception of column (2) the regression coe±cient on the terrorism risk variable remains
virtually unchanged through these regressions. The relative change of the coe±cient on
11Scholarship on corruption and growth argues that corruption negatively a®ects growth by increasing
risk and decreasing investment. Mauro (1995) ¯nds a negative e®ect of corruption on investment.
19terrorism risk in column (2) re°ects the mechanical relationship between the index of polit-
ical stability and terrorism. In addition, the inclusion of the political stability index in the
regression increases the standard error of the regression coe±cient on the terrorism index
variable, due to the high correlation between the political stability index and the GTI. The
results in Table 6 indicate that, when we include the corrected Country Risk Index and
the other previously tested variables in our regression, additional indicators of quality of
governance do not have a signi¯cant e®ect on net FDI positions.
4.2.4. Financial Factors, Macroeconomic Risk, and Natural Disasters
International capital °ows have been found to depend on the degree of ¯nancial development
in a country (see, e.g., Albuquerque, Loayza and Serv¶ en, 2005). In a general sense, stock
markets facilitate the °ow of a signi¯cant share of foreign direct investment. Furthermore,
newly established foreign ¯rms, both those acquired through the stock market and those
established as foreign direct investments, require ¯nancial services. Thus, as they make
investment decisions foreign investors should account for the degree of development of a
country's ¯nancial sector, and particularly the development of the banking sector, as both
of these factors will a®ect the returns of their investments. The ¯rst column of Table 7
reports a regression where we include a common measure of ¯nancial development, the total
volume of credit of the banking industry as a share of the GDP, as an additional explanatory
variable. This measure of ¯nancial development does not exhibit a statistically signi¯cant
coe±cient and its inclusion renders most of the other regressors insigni¯cant; the coe±cient
on the terrorism risk variable remains, however, marginally signi¯cant.
Exchange rate °uctuations a®ect international capital °ows and stocks of foreign invest-
ment. Risk averse ¯rms may decide not to invest in a country if exchange rate volatility is
high (see, e.g., Campa, 1993). We have constructed a measure of foreign exchange °uctua-
tions as the range of variation of the real e®ective exchange rate over the 1994-2003 period.
Data availability for the construction of this variable restricts the sample to 55 countries
only. The second column of Table 7 includes this measure of exchange rate °uctuations
as an additional regressor. The evidence for this subsample indicates that this ¯nancial
20factor does not exhibit a signi¯cant coe±cient and its inclusion renders the coe±cient on
the other regressors insigni¯cant, potentially an e®ect of the small sample size.
It has been documented that a high degree of intervention of the government in the
economy may deter foreign investment (see, e.g., Albuquerque, Loayza and Serv¶ en, 2005).
Using the ratio of government consumption over GDP as a measure of government inter-
vention, we obtain the results reported in column (3) of Table 7. The coe±cient on the
additional regressor is not statistically signi¯cant. The inclusion of the measure of govern-
ment intervention does not a®ect greatly the coe±cients on the terrorism risk index and
other variables, or their statistical signi¯cance.
Growth instability potentially a®ects FDI as a source of uncertainty (see, e.g., Albu-
querque, Loayza and Serv¶ en, 2005). While a fast-growing economy might attract foreign
investment, macroeconomic instability might deter foreign investment. To account for
growth variability we use the standard deviation of GDP growth over the decade 1994-2003.
Column (4) of Table 7 indicates that growth variability is not a signi¯cant determinant of
the net foreign investment position. However, the coe±cients on terrorist risk and the other
explanatory variables remain signi¯cant.
The theoretical model developed in this article conceptualizes terrorism as catastrophic
risk. However, terrorism is not the only instance of catastrophic risk. To further validate
our empirical ¯ndings, we include in column (5) of Table 7 a measure of earthquake risk (the
number of deaths caused by earthquakes during the period 1994-2003 normalized by 100,000
population in 2003).12 If our empirical approach to investigate the e®ects of catastrophic
risk on investment is appropriate, this new variable should exhibit a negative coe±cient
in our regression. Indeed, the coe±cient on the earthquake risk variable is negative and
signi¯cant at the 10% level. The inclusion of this variable in the regression leaves the
coe±cient of terrorist risk virtually unchanged.
12Natural disaster data are from the OFDA/CRED International Disasters Data Base.
214.3. Discussion
Our results demonstrate that terrorism risk has signi¯cant explanatory power on net FDI
investment positions. In principle, the impact of terrorism on FDI positions estimated
in our regressions would be exacerbated if omitted determinants of FDI are negatively
correlated with terrorism. We show, however, that our regression results are robust under
alternative speci¯cations, which control for a variety of factors suspected to a®ect foreign
investment.
On the contrary, there are a number of reasons to believe that our estimates may be,
in fact, conservative.
First, our estimates of the impact of terrorism on foreign investment will be biased by
reverse causation if the presence of foreign capital in a country induces a terrorist response.
Notice however that, in this case, reverse causation would create a positive bias in the
estimated coe±cient on terrorism risk. Because we estimate a negative coe±cient on the
terrorism risk variable, the potential bias created by reverse causation would not change
the qualitative conclusions of this study, i.e. the true coe±cient would also be negative but
larger in absolute value.
Moreover, notice that most of the estimates in this section re°ect the degree of statistical
association between terrorism and net FDI positions over GDP holding constant the level of
per-capita GDP of a country (and other explanatory variables). Therefore, our analysis will
underestimate the long-run e®ects of a terrorist shock on an economy if foreign ownership
of the capital of a country boosts the level of per-capita income of the country (e.g., via
transfers of technology), and if increases in per-capita income tend to reduce the level
of terrorism. Under these conditions the negative impact of a terrorism shock would be
exacerbated by feedback e®ects.13
There are two additional reasons to believe that our estimates provide in fact a conser-
vative measure of the impact of terrorism on foreign direct investment. First, the country
13However, empirical studies have failed to ¯nd evidence of the existence of a causal e®ect of per-capita
income on terrorism. See Krueger and Laitin (2003) and Abadie (2004).
22latent level of terrorist risk cannot be directly observed and the GTI will measure it with
error. If terrorism measurement error is \classical" (additive and independent of the latent
terrorist risk) our estimates will be biased towards zero. Second, our estimates of the e®ects
of terrorism on capital °ows are attenuated to the extend that they re°ect only the impact
on capital °ows across countries. If terrorist risk levels vary within countries, the e®ect of
terrorism on the regions that are most a®ected by it will be more severe than what our
estimates suggest.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we have shown how terrorism in°uences the equilibrium decisions of in-
ternational investors in an integrated world economy. We have introduced terrorism as
catastrophic risk in a standard endogenous growth model and analyzed the e®ect of an
increase in terrorist risk on the net FDI position of countries. The model suggests that
in an integrated world economy, where international investors are able to diversify other
country risks, terrorism may induce large movements of capital across countries. The em-
pirical evidence, based on cross-country regressions, indicates that terrorist risk depresses
net foreign investment positions. This relationship is robust to the introduction of demo-
graphic factors, country-speci¯c risk indexes, governance indicators, and other ¯nancial and
macroeconomic factors such as per capita GDP and FDI restrictions which might determine
the country's FDI position.
Our estimates suggest that a one standard deviation increase in the intensity of terrorism
produces a 5 percent fall in the net FDI position of the country (normalized by GDP). Both
the model and the empirical evidence suggest that the open economy channel may be an
important avenue through which terrorism hurts the economy.
23Appendix A: Solution to the model
For the model in Section II, the value function is:
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Notice that V (k) = e¯tV (k;t) does not depend on t. Using this property of the value
function the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation simpli¯es to:
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Solving the maximization problem on the left-hand side of last equation, we obtain the
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24For the FOC, we obtain:
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It is easy to see that the SOC hold if b c ¸ 0 and 0 · b v · 1. In particular, the derivative of
the left hand side of last equation with respect to b v is negative for 0 · b v · 1. Therefore,
evaluating the left hand side of last equation at b v = 0 and b v = 1 implies the following
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Terrorism exerts a substitution and an income e®ect on consumption. To obtain the
substitution e®ect, di®erentiate C with respect to ¸ for a ¯xed level of lifetime util-
ity v0 (compensated by changes in K(0)). We know that V (K(0);0) = V (K(0)) =































































To verify this condition we ¯rst apply Ito's Lemma for jump-di®usions to obtain:
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Because lnK(t) is also a jump-di®usion, we can apply the results in Du±e, Pan, and
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Therefore, the transversality condition holds if and only if ¼C > 0.
26Appendix B: Additional Data Information
² Foreign Direct Investment assets and liabilities, 196 countries and territories, 2003.
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
² Global Terrorism Index, 186 countries and territories, 2003/4. World Markets Re-
search Centre.
² Country Risk Index, 186 countries and territories, 2003. World Markets Research
Centre's analysts rate the political, economic, legal, tax, operational, and security
environments of each country and combine those six factors into a single index given
by:
s·
(0:25 £ (Political Risk)2) + (0:25 £ (Economic Risk)2) + (0:15 £ (Legal Risk)2)
(0:15 £ (Tax Risk)2) + (0:10 £ (Operational Risk)2) + (0:10 £ (Security Risk)2)
¸
:





(0:25 £ (Political Risk)2) + (0:25 £ (Economic Risk)2) + (0:15 £ (Legal Risk)2)
(0:15 £ (Tax Risk)2) + (0:10 £ (Operational Risk)2)
¸
:
² Gross Domestic Product in US dollars for 2003. The World Bank, World Development
Indicators.
² Population. The World Bank. World Development Indicators.
² Percentage of population aged 0-14 and 65 and over, 2002. The World Bank, World
Development Indicators.
² The Age Dependency Ratio is computed as population aged 0-14 or 65 and over
divided by population aged 15-64.
² Index of capital °ows and foreign investment restrictions, a factor of the Index of
Economic Freedom. The Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal. Miles et
al, 2004, http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/.
27² Restrictions on repatriations of FDI earnings. International Monetary Fund, 2001b.
² The net enrollment rate in primary school and the net enrollment rate in secondary
school. These data, from United Nations Educational Scienti¯c and Cultural Orga-
nization (UNESCO).
² Average Years of Schooling of Adults. The World Bank Education Statistics.
² Governance Indicators. Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2004).
² Corruption Perception Index. Internet Center for Corruption Research (University
of Passau and Transparency International, http://www.icgg.org.
² Private credit by deposit money banks and other ¯nancial institutions to GDP. Fi-
nancial Structure and Economic Development Database, See Beck, Demirguc-Kunt
and Levine (1999). This database has been updated to 2001.
http://www.worldbank.org/research/projects/finstructure/database.htm
² Real e®ective exchange rate. International Monetary Fund. International Financial
Statistics, series code (XXX..RECZF...). 1994-2003.
² General government ¯nal consumption expenditure (% of GDP). 1994-2003 average.
International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.
² Standard Deviation of growth rate. Computed as the standard deviation of the annual
growth rates of GDP (constant prices, local currency units) for the period 1994-2003.
International Monetary Fund. International Financial Statistics.
² Earthquake risk index. Computed as the number of deaths caused by earthquakes
during the years 1994-2003 (OFDA/CRED International Disasters Database,
(http://www.em-dat.net/) per 100,000 population in the year 2003.
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33Table 2 { Descriptive Statistics for Economic Variables
Number of Correlation
Countries Mean S.D. Range with GTI
Net FDI Position (over GDP) 110 0.28 0.39 [-0.62, 2.97 ] -0.1360
Log per capita GDP 110 7.91 1.61 [ 4.88 , 10.79 ] -0.0639
FDI Restrictions 98 2.66 0.91 [ 1 , 5 ] 0.0714
Demographic factors:
Population under 14 (percentage) 110 29.19 10.38 [14.08, 48.88 ] 0.1020
Population over 65 (percentage) 110 8.05 5.33 [ 2.21 , 18.85 ] -0.1144
Age dependency ratio 110 0.61 0.17 [ 0.16 , 1.04 ] 0.0610
Net primary enrollment rate 84 89.92 12.26 [33.96,104.54] 0.1285
Governance factors:
Voice and accountability 110 0.16 0.94 [-2.05, 1.72 ] -0.1885
Political stability 110 0.14 0.95 [-2.28, 1.63 ] -0.4750
Government e®ectiveness 110 0.13 1.03 [-1.56, 2.26 ] -0.1051
Regulatory quality 110 0.21 0.95 [-1.95, 1.93 ] -0.1259
Rule of law 110 0.13 1.01 [-1.76, 2.03 ] -0.1808
Control of corruption 110 0.11 1.06 [-1.70, 2.39 ] -0.1480
Macroeconomic factors:
Credit (over GDP) 73 0.58 0.45 [ 0.04 , 1.61 ] 0.1902
Real e®ective X-rate range 58 26.60 15.78 [ 6.97 , 58.22 ] -0.0029
Gov. Consumption (over GDP) 108 16.46 6.59 [ 5.40 , 42.43 ] -0.2367
Std. Dev. growth rate 104 0.04 0.04 [ 0.00 , 0.38 ] 0.0254
Other factors:
Earthquake risk index 109 0.28 1.76 [ 0 , 17.74 ] 0.0550
34Table 3 { Baseline Specifications
Dependent variable Net FDI positions over GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 0.3944¤¤ 1.0465¤¤ 0.6996 1.5791¤¤ 1.5354¤¤
(0.0660) (0.2686) (0.4124) (0.4115) (0.4298)
Terrorist risk -0.0028¤¤ -0.0033¤¤ -0.0028¤ -0.0021¤ -0.0025¤¤
(0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Log GDP per capita -0.0802¤¤ -0.0549 -0.1125¤¤ -0.1088¤¤
(0.0321) (0.0395) (0.0315) (0.0332)




Corrected Country Risk -0.1047¤
(0.0599)
Regional Dummies no no yes yes yes
Number of countries 110 110 110 98 98
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.16 0.31 0.30
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
** indicates statistical signi¯cance at the 5% level.
* indicates statistical signi¯cance at the 10% level.
Regional dummies: Middle East and North Africa, Latin America and the
Caribbean, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Rest of Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa
and Western Europe.
35Table 4 { Demographic Factors
Dependent variable Net FDI positions over GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 1.5343¤¤ 1.6677¤¤ 2.3874¤¤ 2.0173¤¤ 2.4245¤¤ 1.7870¤¤
(0.4312) (0.6446) (0.7155) (0.6040) (0.6971) (0.7360)
Terrorist risk -0.0027¤¤ -0.0024¤¤ -0.0024¤¤ -0.0023¤ -0.0021¤ -0.0019
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0013)
Log GDP per capita -0.0910¤¤ -0.1177¤¤ -0.1192¤¤ -0.1358¤¤ -0.1226¤¤ -0.0819
(0.0415) (0.0476) (0.0459) (0.0422) (0.0440) (0.0514)
FDI restrictions -0.0637¤ -0.0620¤ -0.0649¤ -0.0631¤ -0.0639¤ -0.0551
(0.0342) (0.0345) (0.0351) (0.0346) (0.0340) (0.0404)
Country Risk -0.1129¤
(0.0575)
Corrected Country Risk -0.1066¤ -0.1032¤ -0.1000¤ -0.0995¤ -0.0222
(0.0606) (0.0585) (0.0595) (0.0590) (0.0768)
Population under 14 -0.0025 -0.0159¤ -0.0158¤ -0.0100
(0.0066) (0.0090) (0.0090) (0.0095)
Population over 65 -0.0128 -0.0336¤ -0.0335¤ -0.0263
(0.0134) (0.0187) (0.0187) (0.0214)
Age dependency ratio -0.4554
(0.3002)
Net primary enrollment -0.0014
(0.0034)
Number of countries 98 98 98 98 98 80
R-squared 0.31 0.31 0.34 0.32 0.34 0.32
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
** indicates statistical signi¯cance at the 5% level.
* indicates statistical signi¯cance at the 10% level.
All regressions include regional dummies.
36Table 5: Country Specific Risks
Dependent variable Net FDI positions over GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Constant 2.4596¤¤ 2.1268¤¤ 2.3859¤¤ 2.1799¤¤ 2.0688¤¤ 2.3450¤¤ 2.1225¤¤
(0.8291) (0.6562) (0.7351) (0.6752) (0.63701) (0.7528) (0.6094)
Terrorist risk -0.0024¤ -0.0025¤¤ -0.0025¤¤ -0.0026¤¤ -0.0027¤¤ -0.0023¤
(0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Log GDP per capita -0.1252¤¤ -0.0960¤¤ -0.1192¤¤ -0.1022¤¤ -0.0976¤¤ -0.1124¤¤ -0.1035¤¤
(0.0529) (0.0404) (0.0464) (0.0407) (0.0376) (0.0519) (0.0340)
FDI restrictions -0.0668¤ -0.0750¤¤ -0.0676¤ -0.0734¤¤ -0.0728¤¤ -0.0744¤¤ -0.0768¤¤
(0.0356) (0.0356) (0.0351) (0.0339) (0.0343) (0.0350) (0.0316)
Population under 14 -0.0160 -0.0164¤ -0.0161¤ -0.0167¤ -0.0149 -0.0168¤ -0.0157¤
(0.0102) (0.0091) (0.0089) (0.0092) (0.0096) (0.0091) (0.0096)
Population over 65 -0.0325¤ -0.3459¤ -0.0321¤ -0.0345¤ -0.0319¤ -0.0358¤ -0.0328¤
(0.0181) (0.0186) (0.0187) (0.0188) (0.0185) (0.0183) (0.0184)
Political risk 0.0103 -0.0413
(0.0624) (0.0461)
Economic risk -0.0802 -0.0910
(0.0767) (0.0554)
Legal risk 0.0074 -0.0475
(0.0677) (0.0431)
Tax risk -0.0105 -0.0481
(0.1077) (0.0588)




Number of countries 98 98 98 98 98 98 98
R-squared 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.34
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
** indicates statistical signi¯cance at the 5% level.
* indicates statistical signi¯cance at the 10% level.
All regressions include regional dummies.
37Table 6: Governance Indicators
Dependent variable Net FDI positions over GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 2.5294¤¤ 2.3439¤¤ 2.4514¤¤ 2.4396¤¤ 2.4062¤¤ 2.3516¤¤
(0.7165) (0.7665) (0.7178) (0.7750) (0.7184) (0.7318)
Terrorist risk -0.0027¤¤ -0.0019 -0.0026¤¤ -0.0025¤¤ -0.0026¤ -0.0027¤
(0.0011) (0.0022) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0014)
Log GDP per capita -0.1164¤¤ -0.1204¤¤ -0.1119¤ -0.1166¤¤ -0.1169¤¤ -0.1074¤
(0.0470) (0.0460) (0.0566) (0.0453) (0.0518) (0.0572)
FDI restrictions -0.0740¤ -0.0635¤ -0.0695 -0.0709¤ -0.0658¤ -0.0695¤
(0.0357) (0.0350) (0.0420) (0.0411) (0.0374) (0.0390)
Corrected country risk -0.1501¤¤ -0.0862 -0.1362 -0.1237 -0.1091 -0.1183¤¤
(0.0670) (0.0771) (0.0961) (0.0944) (0.0730) (0.0589)
Population under 14 -0.0160¤ -0.0162¤ -0.0155 -0.0155¤ -0.0159¤ -0.0149¤
(0.0900) (0.0090) (0.0094) (0.0089) (0.0091) (0.0094)
Population over 65 -0.0299 -0.3453¤ -0.0331¤ -0.0328¤ -0.0335¤ -0.0319¤
(0.0187) (0.0182) (0.0185) (0.0182) (0.0188) (0.0183)
Governance factors:








Rule of law -0.0135
(0.0839)
Control of corruption -0.0390
(0.0746)
Number of countries 98 98 98 98 98 98
R-squared 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
** indicates statistical signi¯cance at the 5% level.
* indicates statistical signi¯cance at the 10% level.
All regressions include regional dummies.
38Table 7: Financial Factors, Macroeconomic Risk, and Natural Disasters
Dependent variable Net FDI positions over GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 3.2224¤¤ 2.5409¤ 2.3820¤¤ 2.3129¤¤ 2.3275¤¤
(1.3752) (1.4539) (0.7017) (0.7270) (0.7148)
Terrorist risk -0.0023¤ -0.0021 -0.0025¤¤ -0.0025¤¤ -0.0024¤¤
(0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Log GDP per capita -0.0593 -0.0658 -0.1192¤¤ -0.1130¤¤ -0.1156¤¤
(0.0682) (0.1024) (0.0484) (0.0484) (0.0459)
FDI restrictions -0.0806¤ -0.0965¤ -0.0570 -0.0629¤ -0.0676¤
(0.0440) (0.0583) (0.0361) (0.0355) (0.0356)
Corrected Country Risk -0.0989 0.0306 -0.1131¤ -0.1045 -0.0926
(0.1100) (0.1320) (0.0594) (0.0646) (0.0601)
Population under 14 -0.0097 -0.0336¤ -0.0162¤ -0.0157 -0.0155¤
0.0095 (0.0192) (0.0093) (0.0095) (0.0090)
Population over 65 -0.0251 -0.0666¤¤ -0.0356¤ -0.0333¤ -0.0329¤
(0.0205) (0.0264) (0.0186) (0.0184) (0.0188)
Credit (over GDP) -0.1859
(0.1423)
Real e®. X-rate range -0.0028
(0.0031)
Gov. cons. (over GDP) 0.0021
(0.0063)
Std. Dev. growth rate 0.0332
(0.0184)
Earthquake risk index -0.0092¤
(0.0049)
Number of countries 71 55 97 97 98
R-squared 0.38 0.50 0.35 0.34 0.34
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
** indicates statistical signi¯cance at the 5% level.
* indicates statistical signi¯cance at the 10% level.
All regressions include regional dummies.
39Table B1: Country list
186-country sample
Afghanistan, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin,
Bermuda, Bhutan, Brazil, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cayman Islands, Central
African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Cote d'lvoire, Cuba, Cyprus,
DRCongo, East Timor, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, French Guiana, Gabon, Grenada,
India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Libya, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg,
Macau, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Martinique, Moldova, Mozambique, Myanmar (Burma),
Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, North Korea, Oman, Puerto Rico, Qatar, Russia, Rwanda,
Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Syria, Taiwan, Tanzania, Togo,
United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Zimbabwe, plus those countries in the 110-country sample.
110-country sample
Antigua and Barbuda, Comoros, Dominica, Eritrea, Liberia, Maldives, Palestinian Authority,
Papua New Guinea, Sao Tome, Serbia and Montenegro, Seychelles, Sudan, plus those countries
in the 98-country sample.
98-country sample
Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Belarus, Bolivia, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Cape Verde, Costa Rica, Croatia,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,
Estonia, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea,
Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong SAR, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia,
Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho,
Lithuania, Macedonia, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South
Korea, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago,
Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen and Zambia.
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